Will France unseat UK as most capable US ally in EU?

By Robbie Gramer

US policymakers are worried about the UK. The US' closest and most capable ally is facing defence spending cuts that could lower the army to its smallest size in 250 years, inhibit its ability to run both its forthcoming aircraft carriers simultaneously, and drop its defence spending rate below the critical 2 percent of GDP threshold that Nato guidelines stipulate.
The UK’s national elections last week did little to alleviate these concerns.

The Conservatives’ victory raises international concerns over a “Brexit” from the EU and a country fractured along political fault lines through the nascent UK Independence Party and Scottish National Party, which vehemently opposes the country’s nuclear triad.
Defence cutbacks in Europe are nothing new.
Of Nato’s 28 members, only the UK, the US, Estonia, and Greece meet the 2 percent of GDP defence spending target.
If the UK no longer does, it would be a substantial political and symbolic blow to the Alliance. As President Barack Obama reportedly warned UK Prime Minister David Cameron during his visit to Washington in January, “if Britain doesn’t spend 2 percent on defence, then no one in Europe will.”
These worries are juxtaposed by France, where President Francois Hollande announced last week a multi-billion euro boost in defence expenditures at a time where France is strengthening its military footprint around the world.
But beyond the numbers, these projected defence cuts manifests a larger existential debate on how the UK defines itself in the world.

Cracks and fissures are appearing around the edges of the UK’s globalised foreign policy, from the bungled 2013 Parliament vote on intervention in Syria after Cameron convinced the US it was a done deal, to Cameron’s conspicuous absence from the ceasefire agreement his French and German counterparts brokered between Russia and Ukraine, to record-low public support for retaining the UK’s nuclear trident (the linchpin of its nuclear deterrence), to the unresolved “Brexit” debate that continues to erode the UK’s standing in the EU.
While the UK elections featured a swell of bold platforms from all factions, no political party seemed willing to tackle the uncomfortable question that underlies all these elements: Does the UK still have an appetite for a grander role and global presence, or does it want to close ranks and merely defend the realm?
This question does not augur well for the US' future reliance on the UK as its go-to ally for new military operations. But France is poised to fill the void, and nowhere is this better manifested than the international campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).
The UK has been an active member of the international coalition fighting ISIS, contributing to over 400 missions in the US-led airstrike campaigns, and training over 1,000 Kurdish Peshmerga fighters as of last month.
France outshined the British in the anti-ISIS coalition. France was the first European ally to contribute to the airstrike campaign with ISR missions.
It flies three times more sorties against ISIS than the UK, and deployed the crown jewel of its navy, the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier, to the Persian Gulf to aid in the airstrikes, notably under US command.
By contrast, the UK has no aircraft carriers in its fleet that will be deployable before 2017.
France does not meet Nato’s 2 percent threshold. But unlike many Nato allies, it froze its defence spending cuts and will hold at 1.5 percent of GDP despite surmounting financial and political pressures to capitulate and reduce defence spending.
This starkly contrasts with the UK. The ink was barely dry on an Alliance-wide commitment to reverse defence cuts at the Nato Summit in the UK last September when it was revealed the summit’s host nation likely won’t uphold this pledge.
The US and France have historically diverged in their foreign policies in ways that the US and UK never have. France is a longtime critic of the hyperpuissance americaine, which became a sizeable political thorn in the US’ side during the days of the Iraq War.
But with time, these sentiments have ebbed. And today, Paris and Washington frequently find themselves on the same side of foreign policy issues, from combating ISIS to a hardline posture on Iran to shoring up NATO forces in Eastern Europe.
Moreover, there is mutual French and American aspiration to wean Europe off its overdependence on US military guarantees.
France successfully led a large-scale operation on foreign soil in Mali in 2013 and retains a residual force of 3,000 troops dedicated to countering terrorism in the Sahel.
This was a watershed moment for many in Washington, showcasing an independent and large-scale operation that no other American ally in Europe (including the UK) has the capacity or political will to emulate.
The “special relationship” between the US and UK transcends defence issues, and the fundamentals of that relationship will remain strong. But defence spending cuts and doubts over the UK’s wider foreign policy ambitions are casting a shadow that will be hard to shed, and this will amplify France’s stature in transatlantic security.
When the next crises hit, don’t be surprised if Washington calls Paris first, not London.