The West’s ‘Ukraine fatigue’

By David Patrikarakos

In Kiev, deep anxiety — and a hunger for reform.

KIEV — The Mystetskyi Arsenal is an imposing building that dominates Lavrska street in the center of Ukraine’s capital city. A former weapons arsenal built by Catherine the Great, it now houses a museum. But earlier this month it was the site of something more politicized even than Ukrainian art: the annual Yalta European Strategy (YES) conference, organized by Ukrainian businessman Viktor Pinchuk, where political figures from across the world gathered to discuss the crisis in Ukraine. Top of the agenda were two issues of crucial importance to the EU as a whole: the continuing Russian aggression, and the reform of the Ukrainian state.
Since the February 2015 Minsk II agreement, which brought an uneasy — and oft-breached — ceasefire to eastern Ukraine, international attention has veered away from Russian-backed aggression in the region. Politicians and the media have infamously short attention spans, thinking largely in terms of votes and news cycles. Headlines now focus on Greece’s financial crisis and Europe’s migration crisis. Ukraine is almost forgotten.

Which is a mistake. When Moscow illegally annexed Crimea early last year and then sent its special forces into Ukraine’s Donbas region to foment separatist feeling there, it desecrated a post-war European order that had been adhered to with an almost religious fervor for over 60 years. No country has invaded and annexed part of another in Europe since Adolf Hitler.

* * *

This is something Anders Fogh Rassmussen, head of NATO until last year, acknowledges. “The Russian occupation and illegal annexation of Crimea into the Russian federation represents the first example of grabbing land by force since the end of World War II,” he tells me as we meet inside the Arsenal. “If that creates a precedent, then nations in other parts of the world can do the same. If we accept that a nation can just grab land by force then you will unravel the international order we have built since 1945.”
And what is the best way to deal with the Russian aggression that still threatens Ukraine, and by proxy, Europe? His reply is swift: “One of the most efficient measures is for Western countries and organizations to demonstrate unity, cohesion and determination,” he says. “Nations that try to modify their firm stance make it even more difficult to engage Russia in constructive dialogue. Based on my experience the language that is best understood in the Kremlin is the language of unity. The Kremlin loves to divide and rule, and engage with selective allies in an attempt to split our alliances. But if they realize they can’t succeed, then they will conclude that the best way forward is to engage in constructive dialogue.”

 “One of the most efficient measures is for Western countries and organizations to demonstrate unity, cohesion and determination”

He continues: “From a security perspective, NATO must continue to strengthen [its] territorial defense as part of a clear deterrent so Russia wouldn’t even think of attacking NATO allies. The West must also support Ukraine politically, economically and, under certain conditions, [on issues of] security. Politically, by standing firm, including upholding sanctions against Russia. Economically, [by] rapidly implementing the association agreement between Ukraine and the EU, including the free trade agreement. When it comes to security I would say if the ceasefire doesn’t hold and it is clear that Russia and Russian-blamed separatists are to blame then the time has come for the Western nations to consider the provision of defensive weapons to Ukraine.”
“I know this could be used as a pretext by Russia to increase its military involvement, but if the ceasefire doesn’t hold, then what else can be done other than help the Ukrainians to better defend themselves?”
How much of a threat does Russia pose to the NATO alliance? “Russia is potentially a threat, yes,” he replies. “But I would also say that I think the Russians know that Article 5 [which holds that an attack against one ally is considered as an attack against all allies] is the core of NATO and all NATO allies are committed to defend an ally that might be attacked. So actually I don’t think there is an imminent risk of an open Russian attack on any NATO ally, including the three Baltic States.”
The issue, though, I press him, is surely not an open invasion or attack against a NATO member state, but rather an “invasion in all but name”; the return of the unidentified “little green men” that appeared in Crimea and then eastern Ukraine with no official declaration of aggression, let alone war. “We [NATO] are never open about how we would respond — that is part of our deterrent. A potential aggressor does not know what will trigger Article 5. Next point: The definition of an armed attack has changed over time. In Article 5 we use ‘armed attack’ as the classic case, but we are changing. [At a NATO summit] in Wales last year we declared that cyber-security is part of security — so now even a cyber attack could be construed as attack under Article 5.”

* * *

George Soros recently wrote in the New York Review of Books that the EU, far from turning its attention elsewhere, should prioritize the Ukraine crisis, now more than ever. Beset by internal crises that divide it — into creditor and debtor nations, “arrival” and “destination” countries for migrants — Soros argues that Ukraine offers the continent a chance to come together. He’s right. Ukraine is both a European outpost against Russian aggression and a country desperate to join the EU at a time where anti-EU parties and sympathies are gaining ground in most member states.
Oleksii Makeiev, a political director at Ukraine’s ministry of foreign affairs agrees. “Sometime I think that Ukraine and Ukrainians are even more interested in the NATO and EU alliances than the members themselves,” he says.
And Makeiev has no doubt as to the threat Russia poses to both the EU and NATO. What is at stake, he argues, is a fundamental battle about the way geopolitics is practiced. “The difference between the West and Russia in neighboring countries is that the West tries to expand areas of stability and economic development around it; Russia tries to influence and bind countries to Russia by spreading instability all around: creating frozen conflicts — Transnistria Abkhazia, Donbas — as a way to stop those countries developing on their own.”

“If Russian attempts to gain new territory … aren’t stopped they will create even more appetite within the Kremlin to further destabilize Europe.”

He continues: “If Russian attempts to gain new territory in its neighborhood aren’t stopped they will create even more appetite within the Kremlin to further destabilize Europe. Look at the Russian warplanes flying near the borders of EU member states. This happened because the Russians felt that Crimea and East Ukraine have not been addressed in a strict enough manner. Now, once again, this time in Syria, Russian behavior clearly shows that Moscow is not willing to play by the book.”
Makeiev believes the international response to the Ukraine crisis has been inadequate. “A greater and clearer policy of sanctions and international isolation as well as stopping the conversation about a slow return to business as usual is necessary,” he says. “The West cannot allow itself to get Ukraine fatigue.”

* * *

Ukraine is also imperiled from within. Corruption is the Ukrainian disease — it has gnawed at the state since its independence 24 years ago. According to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, in 2014 Ukraine was the 142nd most corrupt country in the world, below Kazakhstan, Malawi and Liberia.  In a report last year by the Legatum Institute, “Looting Ukraine: How East and West Teamed up to Steal a Country,” the journalist Oliver Bullough estimates that about 30 percent, or $15 billion, was stolen annually from Ukraine’s $50 billion state procurement budget alone.
One year into his tenure, how has President Petro Poroshenko done? At the highest levels of government the message seems clear: Corruption is going to be fought. But it’s not an easy task.
Inside the Arsenal, in hallways with curved ceilings supported by squat ridged pillars, I saw French philosopher Bernard-Henri Lévy strolling along nonchalantly, his white shirt characteristically unbuttoned. Meanwhile, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, surrounded by a phalanx of suits, made his way to a panel discussion where former Israeli President Shimon Peres waxed lyrical — as is his wont — about the old days. In the main thoroughfare, I met with Andriy Pyvovarsky, Ukraine’s minister of infrastructure.
Describing himself as being responsible for “the earth, water and sky — plus the post” Pyvovarsky is responsible for around 5 percent of GDP.  One of his most pressing tasks is to improve Ukraine’s road system — 97 percent of roads, he tells me, require major repair. The problem is tackling those that don’t want reform. Pyvovarsky has a solution to this. “I have to liquidate certain companies completely because they are so corrupt and inefficient I cannot reform them,” he says. “The people working in them are so corrupt that I cannot change just 10 or 20 percent — I must change everyone.”

“The general public is suffering in the short term and the populists are succeeding in making them believe [it’s] because of the reforms.”

Pyvovarsky is trying to take the weight off Ukraine’s roads, an undertaking which shows the dysfunctional nature of modern Ukraine and the challenges facing reformers. “During Soviet times 60 million tons of cargo were carried on the river,” he tells me. “This year it will be 6 million tons: Overweight vehicles are killing Ukrainian roads. So I am bringing in new legislation to rectify this. This will bring in insane strikes, the owners of the trucks and other heavy vehicles will go nuts, but we have no choice.”
What Pyvovarsky fears most is populism — along with the return of what he calls “the old guys.” “Due to national economic hardship and the hard reforms we are implementing, the general public is suffering in the short term and the populists are succeeding in making them believe that they are suffering because of the reforms. But they are suffering because the previous government stole billions of dollars and we are trying to fix it. We have local elections at the end of October and I hope that the old guys [from ex-President Viktor Yanukovych’s party] won’t make a comeback.”

* * *

Aivaras Abromavičius, Ukraine’s Lithuania-born minister of economy and trade, echoes these feelings. “My mission is to improve the investment climate in the country and to fight corruption and the first is not possible without the second,” he tells me. “When you deal with one of most corrupt countries in the world this topic is difficult.”
The biggest problem Abromavičius faces are what he describes as “vested interests” — the people who have run the Ukrainian state since independence. “People are used to the fact that the state budget is the ocean you can drink from; that you’d be silly not to do so because everyone before you did. Society has too high a tolerance for corruption. People think that if a minister steals less than his predecessor he is a good guy. But we want to be different and we are sending a message that we will not tolerate this.”
His problems began almost as soon as he took office. “I chair a commission that sells oil. By law whoever bought it was eligible for a 15 percent discount — up to $200 million. I decided to put an end to this and the resistance from vested interests was considerable. They blocked the auction for two months and threw all sorts of wild accusations at me, saying military equipment would run of out of fuel, but we held firm and they eventually backed down.”
He continues: “Improving the investment climate is key. Our regulatory environment was repressive because the inspectors and controlling agencies were not advisors to business but rather worked as policing agents, who collected bribes. To get anything done you had to pay money. So deregulation is my main reform. I identified 201 paying points: licenses, permits etc. that had to be removed. We have already removed 90 and by the year’s end we will have completed the task.”

* * *

What struck me most about Pyvovarsky and Abromavicius was their age. Both are in their thirties. I wondered if Poroshenko was deliberately choosing young ministers because they were unlikely to be tainted by the old regime. I put this question to Volodymyr Groysman, President of Ukraine’s Parliament — and a mere 37 years old — when I met with him. “I am for sure not representing the old type of Ukrainian politicians,” he replied. “I think that I have progressive views and values agreeable to the civilized world.”
As president of Parliament, Groysman believes that the key to Ukraine’s future is decentralization. But it has also been hugely contentious. Last month, Parliament passed the first stage of a bill allocating more powers to the regions, including the occupied east. There have long been calls for a greater devolution of central authority and with Donetsk and Luhansk controlled by forces seeking to break from Ukraine, Minsk II partly envisaged decentralization as a form of compromise. This has gone down badly with the far right. On August 31, an ultra-nationalist in a crowd of protestors threw a grenade at police outside Parliament as the debate raged indoors. Several people died.

“Corruption is the evil that destroys Ukraine from the inside”

“Corruption is a consequence of a system of management in which all the resources are concentrated at the center,” Groysman said. “This is a hybrid of the Soviet system that has emerged during the 24 years since independence. So I stand not only for fighting the consequences of corruption but reforming the system to prevent it in the first place. Minimizing the influence of the state in those areas where you have the largest corruption is critical. Corruption is the evil that destroys Ukraine from the inside.”
“Corruption is effective in those areas where decisions are taken behind closed doors,” he added. “Decentralization will [make] decision-making more transparent.”
Groysman concluded on the most positive note I heard in Ukraine. “Decentralization will provide for the birth of new political elites; people will come into local politics and then into national politics. If today 20 people hold power, in the future 40 million will be involved at different levels. The structure of the economy will start to change, small- and medium-sized enterprises will become bigger players. Those that control the situation today will gradually lose control.”